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This paper attempts to theoretically understand the process of catching-up or falling behind 
particularly within the context of developing countries. The main aim of the paper consists 
in investigating the impact of domestic innovation, via its interaction with the learning 
capability, on the technology gap of an economy. More specifically, we seek to shed some 
light on why the tendency for poor countries to fall further behind, despite efforts to 
improve their learning capabilities, appears pervasive. Our analysis is based on a simple 
model of technology gap elaborated by Verspagen (1991). We find that domestic 
innovation, a critical component for the development of an absorptive capacity, is a 
significant determinant of whether an economy catches-up or falls further behind. 
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Amongst developing countries, there is a growing rift between the few economies
that have managed to ”take-oﬀ” and the overwhelming majority that is in-
creasingly being marginalised by the current economic trend of rapid trans-
formations. This paper addresses the question: What lies behind the ability of
a handful of developing countries to catch-up whilst the vast majority recedes
further into marginalisation? We use the Schumpeterian-inspired technology
gap approach that has been developed within the evolutionary growth the-
ory, and whose main assertion is that innovation and diﬀusion are the main
sources of growth. It is an alternative perspective to the mainstream neo-
classical inspired growth theory, and its main distinguishing characteristic is
that interactions among ﬁrms, government and research institutes provide
feedback mechanisms that involve learning; learning determines innovation
that leads to technological change.1 Emphasis is placed on enhancing the
learning process rather than on providing the ”right” economic incentives
(notably patents and subsidies) to proﬁt-maximising entrepreneurs who ex-
ploit ”publicly” available knowledge: innovation is viewed as a complex phe-
nomenon that is highly cumulative and path-dependent, and is inﬂuenced
by various factors both measurable and immeasurable, including organisa-
tional,institutional and cultural set-ups.
The central question in the technology gap approach consists in investigat-
ing why growth rates diﬀer across countries, and it is argued that the answer
lies in diﬀering rates of technology growth. Kaldor (1957) was the ﬁrst to
suggest that diﬀering growth rates in the long-run could be explained by dif-
ferences in endogenous technological progress. The underlying idea was that
investment and learning were interrelated and formed the basis for techno-
logical progress: the rates at which investment and learning took place de-
termined the rate of technological growth. Gerschenkron (1962) who studied
1See for example Rosenberg (1982) and Lundvall (1988)
2international aspects of the process of innovation and learning pioneered the
idea that technology gaps that exist between technology frontier economies
and laggards provide great opportunities for the latter to acquire technol-
ogy through assimilation of the existing backlog of knowledge. However, he
emphasised that exploitation of the potential technology beneﬁts by lagging
countries is not an automatic process and may involve a lot of eﬀorts and
substantial costs in the development of new institutions, organisation and
policies that support transitions into the more technologically productive in-
dustries.
It was not until the 1970s when this perspective was revisited by inter alia
Gomulka (1971), Cornwall (1977), Maddison (1979), and Abramovitz (1979),
leading to the so-called technology gap literature that has widely explored
the catching-up process of countries that lag behind. The main hypotheses
in this approach are that: technology growth rates have a positive impact on
economic growth rates, lagging economies may exploit the backlog of existing
knowledge through a catching-up process that allows them to approach the
technology frontier, and an absorptive capacity that to a large extent de-
pends on direct government intervention, particularly by steering resources
to the most technologically progressive sectors of the economy, determines
the ability of a lagging country to embark on a successful catching-up process.
An interesting technology gap model of economic growth per se was elabo-
rated by Fagerberg (1988). In his model economic growth depends on three
factors: domestic innovation, foreign innovation, whose contribution depends
on the size of the technology gap, and the capacity to exploit both domes-
tic knowledge (diﬀusion) and foreign knowledge (assimilation), which may
be referred to as the absorptive capacity. Hence, the technology level of a
country ultimately depends primarily on the level of its innovative activ-
ity. One of the most important insights of the model is that it emphasizes
that innovation is not exclusively conﬁned to industrialised countries because
3the ability of developing countries to beneﬁt from international diﬀusion ne-
cessitates domestic innovation. Fagerberg (2002) summarises this point as
follows: ”[...] successful imitation (or diﬀusion) often involves innovation
as well, and that innovation and imitation generally draw on the same ca-
pabilities or resources.” From a developing country point of view emphasis
is placed on incremental transformations, which are responsible for the bulk
of technological knowledge. Scientiﬁc discovery through R&D is not the au-
tonomous determinant of technical change. ”If we characterise the impact
of some innovations as ’major’, ’basic’ or ’radical’, it is only because of the
continuous stream of incremental innovations following the introduction of a
basic new design.”, Verspagen (2004).
A vast amount of research using the technology gap approach has yielded
a lot of interesting results with regard to the catching-up process. Notable
examples in recent literature include Fagerberg (1987), Abramovitz (1994).
Fagerberg (1987) analyses the diﬀering growth performances of OECD coun-
tries as well as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Hong Kong and
Taiwan and ﬁnds that technology gap models adequately explain diﬀerences
in growth amongst industrialised countries, and that rapid imitation and
high growth in innovative activities, particularly in South Korea and Fin-
land have led to the high growth rates. In the same vein, Abramovitz (1994)
explains that successful post war catch-up by European countries vis a vis
the United States was as a result of the enhanced capacity of the former to
exploit the backlog of existing knowledge through the improvement of tech-
nological congruence and social capabilities. Various studies on catching-up
by the newly industrialising economies (most of which brought the World
Bank (1993) report under ﬁre) stress the important role played by policy in
steering economies to more technologically progressive sectors.2
Although the vast majority of laggards have continued to fall further be-
2See for example, Chang (2003) and Jomo (2001).
4hind, scant literature is available on falling behind economies. Indeed, only a
handful of developing countries have managed to engage in the catching-up
process, and as Temple (1999) observed, ”Poor countries are not catching-up
with the rich, and to some extent the international income distribution is
becoming polarised.” Verspagen (1991) demonstrates that lagging economies
may fall further behind because catching-up is not an automatic process,
while Abramovitz (1994) implicitly suggests that it is the inability of devel-
oping countries to improve their technological congruence and social capa-
bilities that thwarts their eﬀorts to engage in a successful catch-up process.
However, no work to my knowledge, focusing on unveiling the very nature of
the pervasive process of marginalisation exists.
This paper is a ﬁrst step in unveiling the pervasive phenomenon of falling
behind. However, given the vastness in scope of the topic we shall only touch
on the fringes by attempting to incorporate the Schumpeterian inspired idea
that ”Innovation [...] is a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary capitalism
and may be an important source of growth in poorer countries as well (though
not necessarily in the same proportion as in a frontier nation)”, Fagerberg
(2002). We base our analysis on the technology gap model developed by
Verspagen (1991) that we brieﬂy present in the next section before incorpo-
rating the eﬀect of domestic innovation on growth in developing countries in
section III. The model is simulated in section IV followed by a discussion on
implications for developing countries in section V. The last section concludes.
2 Modelling dynamics of the technology gap
The key contribution of Verspagen (1991) in explaining why both catching-up
and falling behind are possible outcomes, is that his dynamic model captures
the fact that assimilation or exploitation of the backlog of existing knowledge
5by a lagging country is not an automatic process.
A two country model is assumed in which a country North is at the tech-
nology frontier while a country South is lagging behind and may have the
possibility of assimilating the backlog of knowledge spillovers and engaging
in a catching-up process with North: the catching-up process is assumed to
be possible due to the existence of both a technology gap and knowledge
spillovers. All other sources of knowledge (aside from knowledge spillovers)
are assumed to be exogenous.
The technology gap
The technology gap (G) is a logarithmic relation between the knowledge
stocks (K) of the two countries so that a zero gap exists for countries with





Subscript n represents North while subscript s South.
The exogenous stock of knowledge
It is assumed that the stock of knowledge grows over time at an exogenous
rate β for each country, where the stock of knowledge emanating from sources
other than knowledge spillovers is exogenous. Hence, knowledge growth in
the North is determined solely by the exogenous rate (βn), while knowledge
growth in the South is determined by both the exogenous rate (βs) and
knowledge spillovers (S) from the North. The model also assumes that the
South neither catches-up completely nor overtakes the North because it is






= βs + S (2)
6The spillovers
In an attempt to take into account the fact that knowledge assimilation is
not an automatic process, Verspagen makes a distinction between potential
spillovers and actual spillovers, where the latter is a subset of the former
and whose size depends on the capacity to acquire knowledge. This is done
by assuming that the capacity to acquire knowledge depends on an intrinsic
learning capability (δ) and on the technology gap (G). The intrinsic capabil-
ity is determined by such factors as education, infrastructure etc, following
Abramovitz (1986), while the technology gap reﬂects the fact that knowl-
edge acquisition takes place in a cumulative manner. The functional form of
knowledge spillovers term is represented by:
S |{z}
actual spillovers







where 0< α <1
The size of the intrinsic learning capability (δ) in relation to the size of






δ → 1 actual spillovers = potential spillovers
decreases e− G
δ → 0 actual spillovers = 0
The variation of the gap over time is obtained by taking the time derivative
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7This formulation suggests that equilibrium occurs when the motion of tech-
nology gap equals zero ( ˙ G = 0) i.e. when the diﬀerence in knowledge growth
rates (that reﬂects technological congruence level, Abramovitz 1994) equals
actual spillovers. The expression of actual spillovers suggests two equilibrium
points of the technology gap, a stable and an unstable equilibrium point that
indicate the possibility of catching-up or falling behind. This analysis will
be spelt out in the next sections where we consider the eﬀect of domestic
innovation on the technology gap.
3 The eﬀect of domestic innovation on the
technology gap
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that ”while R&D obviously generates in-
novations, it also develops the ﬁrm’s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit
knowledge from the environment...”. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the
ﬁrst to develop a model (at ﬁrm level) reﬂecting the observation - made by
other scholars of technological change including Mowery (1983) and Fager-
berg (1987) - that innovation is intended to develop the ability to utilise
external knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) take this argument further
and suggest that ”...ﬁrms may conduct basic research less for the particu-
lar results, than to be able to provide themselves with the general background
knowledge that would permit them to exploit rapidly useful scientiﬁc and tech-
nological knowledge, through their own innovations or to be able to respond
quickly when competitors come up with major advances.”
The underpinning idea is that investment in innovation (R&D to Cohen and
Levinthal) widens the knowledge base and improves the critical overlap or
the technological congruence that further facilitates the assimilation and ex-
ploitation of foreign knowledge. We take cue from this idea and argue that
domestic investment in innovation, by improving technological congruence,
8provides further opportunities to engage in the domestic innovation process
that in addition, leads to an enhanced cumulative and interactive process of
knowledge accumulation and assimilation of foreign knowledge: the learning
capability is bolstered by the existence of a commensurate investment in do-
mestic innovation, which is in turn strengthened by the learning capability,
leading to a virtuous feedback eﬀect that leads to catching-up. Domestic
innovation in developing countries speciﬁcally relates to innovative activities
based mainly on incremental knowledge: our analysis is not concerned with
frontier technology
The model
As in Verspagen (1991), we assume a two country model where a country
North is at the technology frontier and a country South is lagging behind,
but may engage in a catch-up process due to the existence of spillovers.
• Redeﬁning knowledge spillovers




However, contrary to Verspagen (1991) where the learning capability
is interpreted as the intrinsic learning capability, we use a more re-
strictive deﬁnition in that our learning capability only considers the
population with technical skills. We consider that ∆, which represents
the part of the population with technical skills, is the population that
has an eﬀective capacity to learn and cope with technological transfor-
mations. This capacity may be interpreted as the learning capability,
Abramovitz (1986). This more restrictive deﬁnition will allow us to
9better understand the pervasive process of falling behind.
The spillovers equation represents actual spillovers as a function of po-
tential spillovers and the absorptive capacity.
S |{z}
actual spillovers






The variation of actual spillovers depends on the learning capability
(∆) and the technology gap (G). With regard to the formulation of
the absorptive capacity, we note that while it may be interesting to
use the sigmoid function that is perhaps better adapted to technology
diﬀusion, the ’decay’ function above produces similar results in terms
of the analysis of spillovers, and has the advantage of simplifying the
application. We now precede with the study of the learning capability
(∆) and the technology gap (G) variables.
• Deﬁning the learning capability
Assumption 1
We assume that the learning capability is equal to the part of the




where Ps is the population with technical skills
and P the total population
Assumption 2
The variation variation of the learning capability ˙ ∆ depends on:











10– The existing part of population with technical skills ∆
where 0 < ∆ < 1
The variation of the learning capability ( ˙ ∆) is therefore expressed by:
















The variation of the part of population with technical skills ( ˙ Ps) de-
pends on:
– the rate at which the population with no technical skills is being
converted to a population with technical skills i.e. the rate of
acquiring technical skills (δ)
– the rate at which the population with technical skills (Ps) emi-
grates, which is taken to be a function of the rate of emigration
in general (θ) and the technology gap (G) of the country.
The variation of population with technical skills is given by the diﬀerence be-
tween the increase of the population with technical skills and the population
with technical skills that emigrates, which is expressed as:
˙ Ps = δ(P − Ps) − Ps(1 − e
−θG) (7)
If θG→1 then Ps(1 − e−θG) = Ps : the whole population with technical skills
emigrates.
If θG→0 then Ps(1−e−θG) = 0 : no population with technical skills emigrates.
11if θG =
(
0 there are no emigrants with technical skills
1 the whole population with technical skills emigrates
The variation of total population ˙ P may be expressed as:
˙ P = γP − Ps(1 − e
−θG) (8)
where the rate of population growth γ =
˙ P
P
The dynamic equation of the learning capability
By substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (6) and noting that ∆ =
Ps
P , the dynamic equation of the learning capability ( ˙ ∆) may be rewritten as:













• Redeﬁning the growth rate of knowledge in the South






= βs + S (10)
However, contrary to Verspagen (1991) we consider that domestic inno-
vation in the South improves the technological congruence of knowledge
between the South and the North, and thus provides further opportu-
nities that act as incentives for the highly skilled population to engage
12in the domestic innovation process. A virtuous feedback mechanism
between domestic innovation and the learning capability then sets in,
thereby strengthening the interactive and cumulative process of knowl-
edge accumulation and assimilation of foreign knowledge.
A relation between the knowledge growth rate and the learning capa-
bility of the South may be established. Since we are concerned with
assimilation of knowledge spillovers by the South we maintain Verspa-
gen’s assumption that the knowledge growth rate in the North (βn) is
exogenous.
Assumption 4
The South’s knowledge growth rate is a function of its learning capa-
bility (βs = f(∆)) such that
if ∆ =
(
0 f(0) = 0
1 f(1) = βn
βs = ∆βn (11)
The dynamics of technology gap
As in Verspagen (1991) the dynamics of technology gap are represented by
˙ G = βn − βs − S (12)
Hence, the dynamic equation of the technology gap may be obtained by
substituting equation (5) and (11) in (12) as follows:




We use a system of two equations (9) and (13) in our analysis of dynamics
of technology gap.












˙ G = βn (1 − ∆) − αGe
− G
∆
∆ = level of learning capability (the part of the population with technical
skills)
G = the gap between the north and the south
Simulations
We assume a set of initial conditions that may characterise a country in the
south.
Initial conditions
∆ = 0.01 (0 < ∆ < 1)
G = 0.38 (0 < G < 1)
Parameters
The set of parameters that lead to convergence are as follows:
δ = 0.05 (rate of imparting technical skills 0 < δ < 1 but is usually < 0.1)
γ = 0.03 (population growth rate 0 < γ < 1)
θ = 0.17 (the rate of emigration θ > 0)
α = 0.55 (degree to which spillovers occur 0 < α < 1)
β = 0.05 (growth rate of knowledge in the north 0 < β < 1)
14Results
Given our set of parameter and a learning capability ∆=0.01, the threshold
technology gap that leads to convergence is G=0.38. We use bifurcation di-
agrams to analyse the eﬀect of the parameters δ (rate of acquiring technical
skills), γ (population growth rate) and θ (emigration rate) on ∆ (the learning
capability) in order to understand their eﬀects on the gap, which either lead
to catching-up or falling behind.
Figure ?? below indicates that the learning capability (∆) grows with the
rate of imparting technical skills (δ). A higher rate of imparting technical
skills therefore favours the growth of the learning capability that consequently
leads to a reduction of the gap through the catching-up process. However, at
very low rates of learning capability (∆=0.0659) an unstable equilibrium that
leads to falling behind is reached. A stable equilibrium, leading to catchin-
gup, is reached at G=0.609.
Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram for rate of imparting tech-skill versus learning
capability
In ﬁgure ?? below, we observe that population growth (γ) does not favour
catching-up: the learning capability falls with an increase in the population
15growth rate, resulting in a larger technology gap, and the economy falls fur-
ther behind as it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to increase the part of the
population with technical skills (∆) i.e. the learning capability. In our ex-
ample the threshold population growth is γ=0.03.
Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram for population growth rate versus learning
capability
With regard to the rate of emigration (θ), ﬁgure ?? below shows that the
learning capability falls with an increase in the rate of emigration, and the
economy falls further behind. In our model, we note that an increase in
the rate of emigration (θ) that aﬀects the population with technical skills is
perhaps triggered by an increase in the part of the population with techni-
cal skills or learning capability (∆) that is not matched with an increase in
domestic investment in innovation: an increase in domestic innovation that
corresponds to the increase in the technical skills, acts as an incentive for the
population with technical skills to engage in the domestic innovation process
rather seek opportunities abroad that are created by innovation investment
in the foreign economy.
16Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram for rate of emigration versus learning capabil-
ity
Dynamics of technology gap
In ﬁgures ?? and ?? below, we study the dynamics of technology gap. The
linear curves b represent the diﬀerence between the rates of growth of the
knowledge stocks in the two countries, which reﬂects the technological con-
gruence level where b=βs−βn (the higher the curve on the y-axis the higher
the technological incongruence level and the larger the technology gap). The
hump-shaped curves represent diﬀerent knowledge spillovers, which result
from diﬀerent rates of imparting technical skills (δ), leading to variations in
the technology gap.
In ﬁgure ??, it is assumed that the technology congruence level is not af-
fected by the learning capability i.e. the rate of growth of knowledge stock
in the South is not a function of the learning capability, βs 6= f (∆), and
the technology gap varies purely due to changes in the exogenous knowledge
stock growth rates in both countries, Verspagen (1991).
As mentioned above, equilibrium occurs at two points when the motion
of technology gap equals zero ( ˙ G = 0): when the technological incongru-
17Figure 4: Simulations for δ=0.05 and δ=0.095 with exogenous knowledge
ence/congruence line b0 equals actual knowledge spillover curves. One equi-
librium point of the technology gap is stable while the other is unstable,
suggesting the possibility of catching-up or falling behind. A stable equi-
librium occurs whenever the spillover curves cut the b0 line with a positive
slope, and an unstable equilibrium is obtained in the inverse case. The un-
stable equilibrium point may be viewed as the take-oﬀ point that leads to
the process of catching-up.
At very low levels of δ there are no net spillovers because the exogenous in-
crease in the technology gap exceeds knowledge spillovers as indicated by the
spillovers curve that lies entirely below the b0 line; complete divergence sets
in. The curves that cut the b0 line represent knowledge spillovers for δ=0.05
and δ=0.095. A higher δ as shown by the dotted curve (in comparison to
the continuous curve) aﬀords larger knowledge spillovers that allow take-oﬀ
to occur earlier (at a higher technology gap that would lead to divergence
for a lower level of δ) and to converge at a smaller technology gap, implying
that the impact of the learning capability on catching-up is more eﬀective
in closing the gap before investment in domestic innovation becomes critical
for complete closure of the technology gap. For total convergence or closure
18of the technology gap to occur, an economy can no longer rely on spillovers
beyond the stable equilibrium point and must engage in domestic innovation
(investment in R&D). This analysis is similar to the one demonstrated by
Verspagen (1991).
We diﬀer from Verspagen (1991) by incorporating the idea that a higher
technology congruence level may be obtained if the observation that domes-
tic innovation widens the knowledge base and improves the critical overlap
further facilitating the assimilation and exploitation of foreign knowledge,
Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Consequently the virtuous feedback mechanism
between the cumulative and interactive process of knowledge accumulation
and assimilation of foreign knowledge that leads to catching-up is strength-
ened, and eventually leads to a higher knowledge stock (K).
In ﬁgure ?? we allow the learning capability to aﬀect the rate of growth of
knowledge stock in the South, βs = f (∆) where ∆ increases with δ, the
rate of imparting technical skills. b1 = βn − βs = βn (1 − ∆) for δ=0.05 and
b2 = βn − βs = βn (1 − ∆) for δ=0.095 i.e. b2 < b1. Indeed, improved tech-
nological congruence is obtained when βs = f (∆) than when βs 6= f (∆):
in the former case the learning capability enhances the critical overlap of
knowledge (b2 < b1 < b0).
As in ﬁgure ??, the dotted spillovers curve in ﬁgure ?? represents δ=0.095,
while the continuous curve δ=0.05. For δ=0.05 take-oﬀ occurs at point C and
the eﬀect of the absorptive capacity peters oﬀ at point B and total closing
up of the gap becomes entirely dependent on domestic R&D eﬀorts. In the
case of δ=0.095, take-oﬀ occurs at point D (at a larger technology gap than
at point C) and own R&D becomes critical at A (at a smaller technology gap
than at point B). A higher rate of acquiring technical skills (δ) is invariably
more favourable to the catching-up process.
19Figure 5: Simulations for δ=0.05 and δ=0.095 with βs = f(∆)
One important point to note, nevertheless, is that in the case where the dif-
ference in the rates of knowledge stocks in the two economies wipes oﬀ the
possibility of the lagging country to beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers (the
level of technological incongruence is too high so that there are no actual
spillovers), the lagging country will consistently fall further behind. More-
over, any eﬀorts to improve the learning capability by raising the rate of
acquiring technical skills (δ) rather than have positive eﬀects that lead to
catching-up, strengthen the process of falling behind. This point is demon-
strated by ﬁgure ?? where we observe that to the right of point D, where
falling behind occurs for both the continuous and dotted spillover curves that
correspond to δ=0.05 and δ=0.095 respectively, divergence takes place faster
in the latter case than in the former. The reason for this outcome is that the
skilled population emigrates at a higher rate in an economy that is locked in
a process of marginalisation: any attempts to improve the learning capabil-
ity (∆) via an increased rate of imparting technical skills (δ) contribute to
making the falling behind phenomenon pervasive. The absence of domestic
innovation translates into unavailability of suitable work opportunities for
population with technical skills, and therefore acts as a catalyst for emigra-
tion of this population.
205 Some implications for economic growth in
developing countries
Notwithstanding the importance of improving the learning capability (δ),
with a view to enhancing growth, this paper demonstrates that the perva-
siveness of marginalisation may result in a situation where improving (δ)
worsens rather than improves the growth outcome in economies where the
rate of growth of technological incongruence balances oﬀ the possibility of
beneﬁting from spillovers. Our model indicates that this tenacious growth
inhibiting process may transpire via emigration of the population with tech-
nical skills, which is heightened by the lack of opportunities in the innovation
process or the sheer absence of an innovation process. Contrary to Romer
(1990), this ﬁnding suggests that competence building does not automatically
spur growth. Romer’s (1990) policy prescription that competence building
subsidies are the best substitutes for R&D subsidies is rather disconcerting;
competence building subsidies are complements rather than substitutes for
domestic innovation subsidies.
Domestic innovation, which is critical for development of an absorptive ca-
pacity, attenuates the emigration of the population with technical skills be-
cause it is able to ﬁnd opportunities that match its competences, which then
serve as incentives for this population to engage in the domestic innovation
process rather than seek favourable opportunities abroad. The policy impli-
cation here is that in order for a favourable outcome to be realised, eﬀorts
should be made on all fronts. Focusing on the learning capability (δ), which
is only one front while ignoring other crucial ones, particularly domestic in-
novation, amounts to a double loss for the lagging economy: resources are
expended in producing technical skills that will eventually be drained out
21of the economy into a better performing one, and especially to a frontier
economy. The population with technical skills emigrates at a higher rate in
an economy that is locked in a process of marginalisation, and any eﬀorts to
improve the learning capability (∆), via an increased rate of imparting tech-
nical skills (δ), in the absence of domestic innovation appear to strengthen
marginalisation.
Diﬀerences in absorptive capacities across countries may be only partly ex-
plained by investment in technical skills. Other elements, some of which may
not be measurable, that lead to successful investment in domestic innovation
are crucial. As pointed out by the technology gap literature, proactive gov-
ernment policies that steer resources to the most technologically progressive
sectors of the economy have been found to provide the best recipe for high
growth. These policies include the creation of institutions that are favourable
for the achievement of successful shifts towards more technology-intensive
sectors in a speciﬁc country context that takes into account immeasurable
factors such as culture. Indeed, as pointed out by Fagerberg (2002) p. xiii,
there must be ”...emphasis on growth as transformation, that is, as a process
of qualitative (and structural) change, in which the success (or lack of such)
of individual countries to a large extent depends on their ability to transform
economic, social and institutional structures.”
Eﬀorts to steer developing economies to sectors with higher growth poten-
tial, diﬃcult as it may be as it requires structural change, is one of the
main solutions to growth. Undoubtedly, such eﬀorts require government in-
tervention: unless conscious policy in favour of technologically progressive
sectors is successfully implemented, reversing the increasing marginalisation
process observed in most developing countries will remain illusory. Not only
is the technology frontier a moving target, take-oﬀ, let alone catching-up,
as we have seen, is not an automatic process. In the contemporary world
successful growth involves mainly qualitative (structure) rather than quanti-
22tative (economies of scale) change and therefore depends on the ability of an
economy to transform its economic, social and institutional structures. Con-
trary to commonly held views, it is in the interest of developing countries,
particularly those that are facing marginalisation and despite their meagre
resources, to wholeheartedly embrace this challenge no matter how diﬃcult
and costly it is.
6 Conclusion
The analysis of the dynamics of falling behind (and catching-up) in this pa-
per has demonstrated two points: well coordinated policies with the primary
goal of progressively shifting economies to technologically progressive sectors
are paramount, and embracing this challenge is a matter of urgency because
time is continuously running out against developing countries. The quasi-
permanent and accelerated marginalisation of lagging economies vis a vis
industrialised countries poses a double challenge to the former. Not only do
they have to ﬁght against time, but they will have to implement policies and
develop institutions (a time consuming and increasingly costly venture) that
will enable them to successfully embark on an innovation-driven path.
Our view is conﬁrmed by the observation that no industrialised country start-
ing with promotion of wool manufacturing in the ﬁfteenth century England
by Henry VII, to the eighteenth century British industrialisation, the Hamil-
tonian inspired structural transformations from production of raw material to
manufacturing (after the long drawn controversy between Smith and Hamil-
ton) in the United States, down to the post-war catching-up economies of
western Europe and recent cases of spectacular catch-up including Finland,
the newly industrialising countries of Asia, as well as the most recent case
of Ireland, have been able to embark on a successful innovation-driven path
without aggressive implementation of technology conscious policies. As is
23evident, China has fully digested this lesson.
Innovation (and diﬀusion) remains the single most feasible determinant of
sustainable growth, even in the poorest of economies. Indeed, any argument
supporting the view that marginalised countries, due to their dire growth
outcomes, should carve out a diﬀerent recipe for growth inter alia, specialisa-
tion in labour intensive activities and importation of high technology goods
in lieu of domestic innovation is purely misguided. Similarly, the suggestion
that competence building subsidies will automatically stimulate knowledge
generation in economies that ’cannot undertake research’, Romer (1990), is
perhaps short-sighted: direct eﬀorts promoting domestic innovative activities
are critical for growth in all economies. It may be observed that amongst de-
veloping countries, the main distinguishing characteristic between the ’better
performing’ ones and the others is that the latter either have no technology
policy or have a defunct one.
The eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of learning depends on the ability to pro-
duce and use knowledge. Thus, general technical knowledge that is acquired
through formal education and training systems has to be complemented with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge (that is made possible through domestic innovation)
in order for it to be productive. However, this analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper, which is a ﬁrst step in an eﬀort to demonstrate that potential
spillovers from foreign knowledge require the existence of an absorptive ca-
pacity - that primarily depends on domestic innovation - for translation into
actual spillovers. Our ﬁndings indicate that the absorptive capacity is the
element of the technology acquisition process that is responsible for creating
an interface between domestic and foreign knowledge: it provides develop-
ing countries with the ability to beneﬁt from the potential foreign-knowledge
spillovers.
An empirical analysis testing the ﬁndings in this paper may be carried out to
24test our hypothesis that domestic innovation is fundamental in developing an
absorptive capacity that is required to allow developing countries to break
away from the process of marginalisation. More speciﬁcally, an empirical
estimation may be used to verify that while it is important to improve com-
petences (through, for example, improved rate of imparting technical skills
through education and training outside the industry), technological beneﬁts
are not likely to accrue unless the improved competences are supported by
domestic innovation. In other words, if improvement of technical skills is
not matched with domestic innovation, an economy may experience adverse
eﬀects. This will be the next step in our investigations.
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